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Studies of change blindness suggest that we bring only a few attended features of a scene, plus a gist,
from one visual ﬁxation to the next. We examine the role of gist by substituting an original image with
a second image in which a substitution of one object changes the gist, compared with a third image in
which a substitution of that object does not change the gist. Small perceptual changes that affect gist
were more rapidly detected than perceptual changes that do not affect gist. When the images were
scrambled to remove meaning, this difference disappeared for seven of the nine sets, indicating that gist
and not image features dominated the result. In a ﬁnal experiment a natural image was masked with an
8  8 checker pattern, and progressively substituted by squares of a new natural image of the same gist.
Spatial jitter prevented ﬁxation on the same square for the sequence of 12 changes. Observers detected a
change in an average of 2.1 out of 7 sequences, indicating strong change blindness for images of the same
gist but completely different local features. We conclude that gist is automatically encoded, separately
from speciﬁc features.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Contrary to our intuitions, visual input is far from highly de-
tailed and stable. Because only information falling on the fovea is
detailed, only successive ﬁxations can offer high-resolution infor-
mation throughout a visual scene (Coltheart, 1999; Henderson &
Hollingworth, 1998). A controversy has emerged, however, about
how much information is carried over from one visual ﬁxation to
the next (Bridgeman & Mayer, 1983; Gilchrist & Harvey, 2000;
Grimes, 1996; Henderson, 1997; Irwin, 1991, 2003; O’Regan,
1992; Pollatsek & Rayner, 1992) and to what degree visual memory
is impoverished (Brockmole & Irwin, 2005; Irwin, 2003; McConkie
& Currie, 1996).
Transsaccadic memory has been generalized to successive
views interrupted by a brief blank, and the resulting memory has
been tested with the phenomenon of change blindness (CB), a fail-
ure to detect striking changes in a scene that occur across brief vi-
sual disruptions. Without a disruption such changes are easily
noticeable. Standard CB studies use a ‘‘ﬂicker” paradigm; an image
(A) alternates cyclically with an altered image (A0), with a brief
white or gray screen (lasting at least 80 ms) interleaved between
images. The dependent measure is response time to detect change
accurately. Observers almost never detect the change on the ﬁrst
cycle and sometimes fail to detect it after 1 min of continuous ﬂick-ll rights reserved.
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set and offset of the images creates a global transient signal that
delocalizes the local transient accompanying the change. Hence,
attention is not attracted to the change location (Rensink, O’Regan,
& Clark, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1997). Reports of detection may be
delayed, however, so that the time of report is in a later sample
than the sample during which detection takes place.
CB is a robust effect (reviewed by Rensink, 2002); changes can
escape detection if they occur during a saccadic eye movement
(Bridgeman, Hendry, & Stark, 1975; Grimes, 1996; Henderson &
Hollingworth, 1999), eye blink (O’Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink,
2000), or camera cut (Simons, 1996). CB is not limited to video dis-
plays. It can arise during real-world interactions, where a conver-
sation partner is replaced by a different individual (Levin,
Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 2002; Simons & Levin, 1998).
CB can also take place when concomitant objects (e.g., ‘‘mud-
splashes”) are superimposed on a scene without covering the alter-
ing object (O’Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 1999). Neither is it limited to
an abrupt transient (either by a blank screen, eye blink, or saccade).
Changes can occur gradually (Simons, Franconeri, & Reimer, 2000),
too slowly to attract attention. A faster, but still smooth change
paradigm ramps a scene from normal contrast to zero contrast in
1 s and immediately ramps back to full contrast in another second
(Turatto, Bettella, Umilta’, & Bridgeman, 2003). The target feature
changes during the instantaneous (10 ms) zero-contrast sample,
and the original and altered images alternate. CB is just as strong
as in the conventional ﬂicker paradigm. Using a modiﬁed ﬂicker
paradigm, Hollingworth and Henderson (2004) rotated a scene
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not to report a change that was obvious if a larger rotation was
introduced in a single step, implying that visual short-term mem-
ory does not ‘‘look back” over successive samples. The scene was a
rotation of the original, however, and not a completely new image
of the same gist.
These ﬁndings imply that target visibility in CB is limited not by
masking, but by focused attention (Enns & Di Lollo, 1997; Rensink,
2000b; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997). While focused attention
may be necessary for change detection, it certainly is not sufﬁcient
(Williams & Simons, 2000). Ballard, Hayhoe, and Pelz (1995) cre-
ated a task where participants took blocks from a stockpile and
duplicated the model in a workspace. During the task, undetected
changes were made to the model. Because the goal of the task was
to duplicate the model, it had surely been the subject of focused
attention. Simons and colleagues have also been able to make
undetected changes to objects of focused attention, when the cen-
tral actor was replaced by a different actor during a movie cut
(Levin & Simons, 1997), when a box replaced a soda bottle (which
had been a central object), when a camera panned away during a
movie (Simons, 1996), and when a conversation partner was
replaced by a different person following a brief visual obstruction
(Simons & Levin, 1998).
At ﬁrst glance the CB results, indicating volatile visual represen-
tations with limited capacity, seem to contradict earlier results
demonstrating robust and extensive memory for images (Intraub,
1981; Potter & Levy, 1969; Shepard, 1967; Standing, 1973;
Standing, Conezio, & Haber, 1970). Though the degree of memory
for visual detail is controversial, the gist of an image is clearly
maintained. Gist is the general visual category of a scene, generally
describable in a few words. It is unclear whether participants in
early image memory studies were using memory for visual details,
memory for gist (conceptual information speciﬁc to the image), or
verbal encoding to discriminate old from new images. Discrimina-
tions typically involved images and distracters that were very dif-
ferent from one another in visual detail and gist; verbal encoding
was almost always uncontrolled. Results in these early studies
could be due to gist encoding or verbal encoding.
Detailed memory of visual properties is actually quite poor
(Mandler & Ritchey, 1977; Pezdek et al., 1988). Participants are un-
able to detect when a photograph has been mirror-reversed
(Standing et al., 1970). Detail memory for a US penny is also poor
(Nickerson & Adams, 1979).
There is evidence that gist (including information about sche-
mas and local and global features) exhibits automatized encoding
(Friedman, 1979). It can be determined within 120 ms of presenta-
tion (Biederman, 1981; Intraub, 1981; Potter & Levy, 1969). Fea-
ture recognition is easier when given external structure; for
example, object identiﬁcation is speeded in a coherent scene (Bie-
derman, 1972). When global properties are stressed, schematic
drawings are identiﬁed faster than detailed images (Ryan & Sch-
wartz, 1956) and global features are recognized better than ﬁgural
features (Palmer, 1977).
Schemas seem to play a role in identifying gist (Biederman,
Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982) and subsequent scene memory
(Brewer & Treyans, 1981). For example, people often remember de-
tails from a scene that were never presented, for instance in
‘‘boundary extension” (Brewer & Treyans, 1981; Intraub, 1999;
Intraub, Bender, & Mangels, 1992; Intraub & Richardson, 1989):
when the top of an image of a car is cropped (cropping the top of
the car), participants remember seeing the entire car. Schematic,
higher order information may inhibit encoding of lower order
information necessary for change detection (Johnston & Hawley,
1994; Pezdek et al., 1988).
CB might be affected by the meaning of an object change. When
changed objects are semantically inconsistent (informative),detection latency is shorter than when they are consistent (non-
informative) (Biederman,1972; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000).
For example, the appearance of a ﬁre hydrant in a living room
was detected more quickly than the appearance of a chair. These
results do not conclusively demonstrate that a change in gist is
more readily detected than a change that does not change gist,
however. Even if an object has meaning relevant to gist, changing
that object does not necessarily change the gist (the meaning of
the whole image). There must be some measure of gist itself, not
just a variable that contributes to gist.
CB and image memory ﬁndings lead to the conclusion that gist
plays a major role in representation and recognition of visual
scenes. The present consensus is that very little is carried over from
one visual ﬁxation to the next, perhaps only 3–4 prominent objects
that been attended previously (Cowan, 2000; Irwin & Zelinsky,
2002; Luck & Vogel 1997; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001), some
information about spatial conﬁguration (Biederman, 1981;
Rensink, 2000a; Sancocki & Epstein, 1997; Simons, 1996), and
the gist (general subject) (Becker & Pashler, 2002; Irwin &
Andrews, 1996; Simons & Levin, 1997; Wolfe, 1998, 1999). The
ﬁrst two aspects of the consensus have been well studied, but
the third is less well understood. If gist is indeed as critical as this
work suggests, the visual systemmight simply assume that a scene
is unchanged as long as its gist remains constant. Consistent gist,
then, might mask changes.
In order to separate gist change from geometric change in
images, we compare detection of changes in image pairs that differ
in gist with changes in image pairs that maintain a constant gist.
2. Experiment 1
The ﬁrst step in evaluating the detectability of gist vs. non-gist
changes is to generate sets of images of constant gist, with alter-
nate forms of differing gist but similar geometric similarity. In or-
der to manipulate gist it is necessary to ascertain the degree of
change in gist that a given image modiﬁcation offers. In this prepa-
ratory experiment we exploit a procedure introduced by van
Montfort (2007) to detect gist change. It consists of three steps:
(1) obtain gist descriptions of the images; (2) have a naïve rater
classify each description with the image(s) it ﬁts with; and (3)
analyze the ﬁt patterns. The results of this procedure should allow
us to change gist between the experimental images and the respec-
tive original images, while maintaining gist in a comparison set of
control images.
We use this procedure rather than a pixel-by-pixel change mea-
sure because almost all pixels remain unchanged in both the con-
stant gist and the changed gist conditions. All pixels are identical
except for the few representing a changed object. The important
changes are in the objects, not in the pixel-by-pixel alterations of
the images, because people perceive objects, not pixels.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Fifty-seven undergraduates (20 men and 37 women, mean age
20.7 years) from the University of California, Santa Cruz volun-
teered to participate in the experiment to fulﬁll a course
requirement.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Each image originated from a natural color photograph. We
used Adobe Photoshop to change each image (A), pairing it with
either an image of different gist (A0) or a control image of the same
gist (A0 0). Images of different gist (A0) were the same as the original
image (A) except that one item had been substituted to change the
meaning of the scene. For example, a log immediately in the path
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kayak (A0). Control images of the same gist (A0 0) were the same as
the original image (A) except that one item had been changed that
did not change gist. For example, the log in the kayaking image (A)
was changed to a rock. Substitutions in both the gist change image
(A0) and the control image (A0 0) were made to the same object.
2.1.3. Design and procedure
The original image, the control image (no gist change), and the
experimental image (the image that was labeled as a gist change)
were presented to a ‘‘generator”, who gave a verbal description
of what he/she thought the image was about. Participants were
told to write the gist (essence or meaning) of the scene in no more
than 4–5 words. Each generator viewed only the original image,
the control image or the experimental image for a given set of
images. In other words, any one generator viewed only one of
the three images for each set of images.
The descriptions of the original image and the experimental im-
age, or original image and the control image, were given to a differ-
ent person, the ‘‘rater”. The rater had no knowledge of which of the
two images was presented to the generator. The rater read each
description and determined whether the description was appropri-
ate for each of the two images. There were, therefore, four possible
categories: the description was (1) not appropriate for image 1 or
image 2 (ﬁt-pattern 0,0); (2) appropriate for image 1, but not for
image 2 (ﬁt-pattern 1,0); (3) not appropriate for image 1, but
was for image 2 (ﬁt-pattern 0,1); and (4) appropriate for both
images (ﬁt-pattern 1,1). This procedure was repeated pairing the
original image and the experimental image for nine sets.
2.2. Results
Fit-pattern distributions for the descriptions of all sets of the
original image and the experimental image (i.e., gist change) were
analyzed using the Fisher–Freeman–Halton exact test (Freeman &
Halton, 1951). All 9 sets were signiﬁcantly different from one an-
other (5 sets p < .05, 3 sets p < .01, and 1 set < .001) in gist.
The ﬁt-pattern distributions for the descriptions of the 9 sets of
the original image and the control image were also analyzed using
the Fisher–Freeman–Halton exact test. Seven sets of images were
not statistically different in gist from one another (p > .1), one set
of images was marginally signiﬁcant (>.1 p > .05), and one set
was statistically signiﬁcantly distinct in gist (p < .05).
2.3. Discussion
All images that were thought to differ in gist, did in fact differ in
gist. The results for the control images support the claim that these
images did not change the gist, with two exceptions. One image,
which was thought to leave gist unchanged, actually did change
gist a bit (marginally signiﬁcant). In this image a man in a BBQ
scene manipulates somemeat with a pair of metal tongs. The tongs
change to a metal spatula. It seems that the reason for the margin-
ally signiﬁcant results is because some participants describing the
two images keyed in on the particular cooking utensil being used
(i.e., the tongs or the spatula), making speciﬁc mention of one or
the other and therefore excluding the possibility that a rater could
assign the description dually to both images.
The other exception which signiﬁcantly changed the gist was a
scene of two surfers surﬁng a wave with two onlooking surfers sit-
ting on their boards. The control image changed the surfers on the
wave to two boogey boarders. Again, the reason for the change in
gist appears to be the speciﬁc mention of objects in the scene—
what the actors on the wave were riding (in Santa Cruz, a surf
town, surﬁng and boogie boarding are quite distinct). Furthermore,
the boards the onlookers are sitting on are somewhat ambiguous.Depending on the context, they could be sitting on surf boards or
boogie boards. In the majority of cases, then, our goals for gist
change or preservation were met, and described differences did
not greatly alter the meanings of the images.
A matter that should be further studied is how to properly de-
ﬁne gist. In the present experiment gist was deﬁned as what par-
ticipants could write in no more than 4–5 words. It was thought
that giving little instruction left participants unbiased and best
able to deﬁne gist according to their personal interpretations.
3. Experiment 2
Most change blindness studies have compared two scenes of
the same gist, usually two identical scenes with only a detail
changed. When two scenes are different in gist, so typically are
the features of the scene. Zelinsky (2003) has argued for a
continuum between perceptual changes and category changes,
though the two can be distinguished by the amount of change in
meaning of a scene. For instance, an ocean scene will usually share
more common features with another ocean scene than with a for-
est scene. Is detection of the change difﬁcult because the changed
detail is not perceived in one or another of the samples, or because
a constant gist suppresses perception of differences? The goal of
Experiment 2 is to answer this question. If constant gist suppresses
detection of changes, then a small perceptual (featural) change that
strongly affects gist should be more easily detected than a percep-
tually equivalent change that does not affect gist. However, if gist
is not critical to eliciting change blindness, then a small featural
change should be difﬁcult to detect whether it changes the gist
of the scene or not.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Eighty undergraduates (23 men and 57 women, mean age
19.8 years) from the University of California, Santa Cruz volun-
teered to participate in the experiment to fulﬁll a course
requirement.
3.1.2. Apparatus
Images were displayed on a color CRT monitor 23 high  32
wide and 1280  1024 pixels in resolution scanning at 75 Hz.
3.1.3. Stimuli
The images displayed were those evaluated in the preparatory
Experiment 1.
3.1.4. Design
CB was examined with a new design, a 2-image alternation par-
adigm. Presentations consisted of cycles between two interleaved
sets of images. In control trials, one set of images (A) alternated
with a second set of unrelated images (B) to create an ABAB se-
quence (Fig. 1). None of the images changed during the trial. Exper-
imental trials alternated between an original image (A) and a
changed image (A0). Trial sequence was determined in two steps.
First, either a control or a change trial was selected at random, with
both equally probable. Second, for change trials the change oc-
curred randomly in either the ﬁrst set (ABA0B) or the second set
(ABAB0). Then the 4-image sequence was repeated. Each image
was displayed for 500 ms with no mask and no blank interval.
(The blank interval used in most change blindness paradigms could
be eliminated because each image set served as an interruption of
the other image set).
Using the ﬂicker paradigm, Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (2000)
have shown that luminance of the blank does not affect the size
of the CB effect. This result seems to support a new-object
A’A
B
B
Fig. 1. The 2-image alternation paradigm. Illustrated is an ABA0B experiments
sequence. In control sequences, A and A0 are identical.
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scene and not the visual disruption caused by transient signals af-
fects CB. In our design, this meant that we could use a second im-
age of slightly different brightness to mask the ﬁrst, and so on
through the sequence.
3.1.5. Procedure
Participants sat with their eyes 60 cm from the monitor at eye
height, with one ﬁnger placed on a key. They were instructed to
press the key immediately if they noticed a change in the displayed
image, but they were not told anything about the nature of the
changes. Participants were free to direct their eye ﬁxations without
restriction.
In half of the trials an image was alternated from A to A0, or B to
B0; in the other half, each image was present throughout with the
temporal parameters given above. Key presses in these trials were
scored as false alarms.
3.2. Results
Independent t-tests with Bonferonni’s correction for multiple
tests revealed that, in all nine sets of images, small perceptual
changes that affected gist were more rapidly detected than percep-
tual changes that did not affect gist (see Table 1), though the size of
the effect varied from set to set.Table 1
Detection of featural vs. gist change detection (CD)
Set Feature CD Gist CD T value (df = 78) P value
M (s) SD (s) M (s) SD (s)
Set 1 34.84 22.85 15.85 12.63 4.60 <.001
Set 2 17.80 18.11 7.15 3.69 3.64 <.001
Set 3 12.88 12.78 7.03 7.15 2.52 <.05
Set 4 8.89 9.36 4.87 2.37 2.63 <.01
Set 5 20.77 22.48 7.70 8.22 3.45 <.001
Set 6 26.84 26.79 5.83 5.85 4.84 <.001
Set 7 12.05 9.79 5.47 6.04 3.63 <.001
Set 8 37.57 21.82 20.59 17.61 3.83 <.001
Set 9 10.41 13.49 5.06 3.14 2.44 <.053.3. Discussion
The results indicate that gist has an important role in the encod-
ing of visual information. A change in the gist of a scene will be de-
tected more quickly than an equivalent perceptual change that
does not change the gist. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that
the differences in the detection rates were not due to confounding
perceptual differences, but rather to changes in the meaning of the
images.
Here we evaluated perceptual differences between an original
image and a control image (no gist change), or the original image
and an experimental image (gist change). The conclusion was that
gist change is critical in change detection, while alteration of image
features is not. The purpose of Experiment 3 is to provide a behav-
ioral measure to test this claim.4. Experiment 3
In Experiment 2 a gist change image or a control change was
coupled with the perceptual changes that occurred in each image.
In Experiment 3, by eliminating meaning from both images while
maintaining the perceptual changes we attempt to decouple gist
from perceptual change. If perceptual changes were matched be-
tween the two images when gist is eliminated, one would expect
the latency of change detection to be equivalent between the
two types of image changes. If one image had perceptual qualities
that could more readily elicit change detection then one would ex-
pect that image to have more rapid change detection even when
gist is eliminated.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Fifty undergraduates (15 men and 35 women, mean age
18.5 years) from the University of California, Santa Cruz volun-
teered to participate in the experiment to fulﬁll a course
requirement.
4.1.2. Stimuli
The control images and experimental images from Experiment
1 were used. Each image was divided into 32 pieces of equal size
(a 4  8 grid), and the pieces randomly arranged to form a new
image.
4.1.3. Design and procedure
A standard ﬂicker paradigm was used, with a 70 ms ISI; the
new image alternated repeatedly with the original image until
detection. For each image set, half the subjects viewed the ori-
ginal paired with the control image and half the subjects
viewed the original paired with the experimental image. Detec-
tion times were compared between subjects for the control
images and experimental images within the same set (from
Experiment 1).
4.2. Results
Independent t-tests comparing the change detection time of the
control image and the gist change image from Experiment 1 re-
vealed that change detection times of seven of the nine images
were not signiﬁcantly different from one another or were different
from one another in a direction that did not favor detection of gist.
(i.e., detection times were signiﬁcantly longer for gist change
images, as in sets 5 and 8 and marginally for set 7). Detection times
for one set of images (set 2) were signiﬁcantly longer for the con-
trol image (see Table 2).
Table 2
Detection of featural vs. gist changes from Experiment 3 when gist is eliminated
Set CD of control pics CD of experimental pics T value
(df = 48)
P value
M (s) SD (s) M (s) SD (s)
Set 1 7.81 11.28 14.76 17.11 1.70 >.05
Set 2a 23.6 20.98 7.21 3.76 3.84 <.001
Set 3 6.71 6.78 4.29 1.49 1.74 >.05
Set 4 3.67 1.98 3.12 1.54 1.03 >.05
Set 5 3.62 2.40 5.92 4.08 2.42 <.05
Set 6 3.12 1.49 3.71 2.72 .96 >.05
Set 7 2.69 .72 3.93 3.04 1.98 >.05
Set 8 2.30 1.00 7.56 8.61 3.04 <.01
Set 9 3.8 2.05 3.62 1.99 .32 >.05
a Statistically signiﬁcant favoring detection of gist more quickly.
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The equivalent detection times or detection times that did not
favor gist detection in seven of the nine sets of images support
the gist assertions from Experiment 1. That is, for most image
groups the results from Experiment 3 support the notion that
detection of change in Experiment 2 was due to differences in gist
rather than any perceptual or featural qualities.
In one set of images detection was signiﬁcantly faster for the
experimental image than the control image. It is likely that the dif-
ference in detection time was due to a luminance difference be-
tween the images. The change in the experimental image was
from a dark gray object to a bright white object. For one further
set of images detection time was marginally longer for the control
image. This could be due to a slight difference in the orientation of
the head of one of the central characters. This orientation change
occurred only in the experimental image and not in the control
image.
5. Experiment 4
In most previous work on CB, including our main Experiment 2,
the stimulus alternates between the original and an altered stimu-
lus. If change really is not detected, though, the altered stimulus
can be used as a new ‘‘original” pattern, and another transforma-
tion can be added. The process can be repeated indeﬁnitely, result-
ing in a modiﬁcation of the ﬂicker paradigm, a ‘‘progressive
transformation paradigm” (Fig. 2). Hidden image substitution
(HIS) would be the result of using this paradigm, where gist is pre-
served while the image changes progressively without the change
being detected. This is a stronger test of the effect of visual short-
term memory on recognition than the ﬂicker or mud-splashes de-Each image is an incremental change from the previous image.
Time
Image
13
     . 
        . 
            . 
               1
Fig. 2. The progressive transformation paradigm. Interleaved unshaded blank
screens are displayed for 70 ms.signs, because all of the details of the original image are eventually
replaced.
One other demonstration of change blindness uses a progres-
sive transformation paradigm, developed independently at the
Exploratorium in San Francisco, CA by Richard Brown and Ted
Koterbas. In this demonstration a highly geometric urban street
scene is transformed stepwise into another urban scene by replac-
ing panels or objects one by one in meaningful units, with brief
blanks between images. For instance, in one change a shop sign
is changed into a different sign, but the location of the sign remains
the same in the new image. Thus, the original and transformed
scenes remain highly correlated and in spatial register. In our pro-
cedure the correlation is not necessary, as a natural unretouched
photograph of one scene is exchanged with a natural photograph
of a completely different scene of the same gist.
We adapt the technique of Blackmore, Brelstaff, Nelson, and
Troscianko (1995), who used CB in a novel way to test the compos-
ite image model of the nature of transsaccadic memory and visual
representation. They displayed images of natural scenes on a com-
puter (image A: a full glass of milk on breakfast table) and pro-
grammed the image to ‘‘jump” from the center to a random
corner, thus inducing a saccade in viewers. During the jump, a
change was made to the image (image A0: an empty glass on break-
fast table) simultaneously. They reasoned that if a detailed visual
representation was indeed stored across saccades, observers
should be able to rely on visual short-term memory to compare
the current image with the stored image. This was contrary to
what they found, however, as they observed a striking 55% detec-
tion rate from their viewers.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
Thirty undergraduate students from the University of California,
Santa Cruz volunteered to participate in the experiment to fulﬁll
course requirement. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
5.1.2. Apparatus
Color photographs of natural scenes were displayed on a CRT
monitor scanning at 85 Hz, 24 high  32 wide in size and
1024  768 pixels in resolution.
5.1.3. Stimuli
Twenty-one photographs were used, 7 of which were control
images that did not have an alteration. The remaining 14 were 7
pairs of images, each pair containing two distinct images that
shared the same gist (picture A and picture A0). For instance, a pic-
ture of a car (picture A) was paired with a picture of a different car
(picture A0) in a different location.
5.1.4. Procedure
Observers sat with their eyes approximately 60 cm from the
computer monitor and placed one ﬁnger on a response button.
They were told that images would ‘‘jump” in random directions
and sometimes ‘‘morph” in small increments into another picture
of similar theme. Their task was to press the response button in
a timely manner if they saw a change.
The control and experimental trials shared the same time
course and design except for the progressive transformation.
Observers viewed the initial picture for 1 s. After a 70 ms blank
screen, the second image (with a superimposed 8  8 checker-
board of blank squares) appeared at another place on the screen
for 250 ms in an unpredictable fashion. This sequence was re-
peated with the same image regions always obscured by the white
checkers until the 13th step was complete (Fig. 3). The control pic-
tures stayed the same throughout all 13 jumps. The experimental
Fig. 3. Unmasked (left) and masked (right) images. In all trials observers saw the unmasked image for 1 s, followed by the masked image alternated with 70 ms blanks. In
control trials the image remained the same for 13 iterations, while in experimental trials it was progressively transformed into another image by substituting squares of the
new image.
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with squares from the new image during each step, in an unpre-
dictable sequence. Order of presentation of the sequences was ran-
domized for each observer. We measured the number of
substitutions accomplished before the observer pressed the re-
sponse key, and whether the key was pressed at all. Pressing the
key ended the display sequence.
A key press during an experimental picture display was re-
corded as a hit, whereas key press during a control picture display
was recorded as a false alarm. Display duration was reduced from
the Experiment 3 duration to prevent observers from consistently
tracking a single square and monitoring it for changes, an algo-
rithm that would always result in change detection.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Failure of detection
Averaging across images and subjects we found a 30% detection
rate (62 hits out of the 210 total possible hits). Fig. 4 shows the
three least-detected sets of images.
On average, each observer made 2.1 out of 7 possible hits, a
strikingly low hit rate. This rate is signiﬁcantly below the expected
hit rate of 7 in a t-test, t(29) = 16.95, p < .001.
We also conducted signal detection analysis on each individual
participant. For eleven of the 30 participants, d-primes were either
at zero or below. In other words, a little more than one-third of our
observers had no discrimination, or slightly worse due to being
unlucky.
5.2.2. Delay of detection
The composite image model, along with other studies (Jonides,
Irwin, & Yantis, 1982), suggests that detailed visual representations
accumulate across saccadic eye movements. The model that they
suggested has been rejected because of stimulus persistence arti-
facts (Bridgeman & Mayer, 1983). The images used were artiﬁcial
geometric arrays, however, much less detailed than natural scenes.
To test this hypothesis with natural images, we looked at the dis-
tribution of our observers’ responses across trials. If detail accumu-
lates across eye movements, then memory of the ﬁrst templateimage should be fairly intact. Furthermore, we should observe a
strong positive linear relationship between hit rate and number
of iterations because as the trials went on, more and more changes
were made to the current image, thus making it more and more
different from the unmasked original and reducing the difﬁculty
of detecting a change. However, if Blackmore et al.’s (1995) sugges-
tion is correct, that only a few attended perceptual details and a
gist survive a saccade, then the accumulation of visual representa-
tion would be much weaker across the trials, and we should ob-
serve a ﬂatter, if at all positive, slope between hit rate and iteration.
Fig. 5 shows the number of substitutions required for detection,
summed across all images. After the ﬁrst few iterations the func-
tion is ﬂat, contradicting the composite image model. The gradual
early rise in detection rate may reﬂect observers’ reaction time in
pressing their button, as the presentation rate was faster in this
experiment than in the above experiments.
5.3. Discussion
Our progressive transformation paradigm provides a stronger
test of the lack of detailed image representation than conven-
tional CB paradigms, because a continuously changing image,
becoming less and less like the original, should become progres-
sively easier to detect with successive change iterations. The ﬂick-
er (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997) and ‘‘mud-splashes” (O’Regan
et al., 1999) paradigms, however, fail to differentiate whether
detection occurs because an observer happens to attend the right
detail at the right moment or because a gradually improving
internal representation has achieved enough detail to enable
detection. The nearly ﬂat rates of change detection that we ﬁnd
over iterations of progressive change suggest that visual repre-
sentation does not build up over time. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the ﬁndings of Mitroff and Simons (2002), who also found
that change detection performance does not accumulate across
successive iterations. Hollingworth and Henderson (2004) came
to the same conclusion when comparing detection rates from a
gradual-change view with a sudden-change view, although their
data show a climb of detection rates over 81 trials, which implies
an accumulation of internal representation. One possible explana-
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Fig. 5. Rates of detection of image change as a function of cumulative number of
changes. The detection rate increases slowly for the ﬁrst few iterations because the
iterations are short, so that a delay in responding spreads over subsequent
iterations.
Fig. 4. The three image pairs that resulted in the greatest failures of change detection in Experiment 4.
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lation of information is very slow, so that our 13-step transforma-
tion is too short to demonstrate their climbing effect. Inspection
of real-world scenes generally conforms to the shorter rather than
the longer sample time.
The eye can saccade to a displaced image only after it has chan-
ged and jumped to a new location. Saccadic suppression begins be-
fore the eye begins to move, but ends with the arrival of the eye at
the new ﬁxation point (Bridgeman et al., 1975). Therefore, saccadic
suppression takes place after the change, so that our observed low
detection rate conﬁrms that attention rather than saccadic sup-
pression is the main factor behind change blindness as previously
suggested (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; Turatto, Bettella,
Umilta’, & Bridgeman, 2003). The relatively ﬂat detection rate in
Fig. 5 indicates that observers do not use information from more
than 1 or 2 previous samples to aid in change detection.6. General discussion
Since CB occurs whenever detecting a change requires more
speciﬁc information than is held in visual short-term memory
(Henderson, 1997), we can conclude from the present experiments
that gist is coded separately from the speciﬁcs of the scene from
which it is extracted. Details must, of course, be used to build up
a gist, but apparently this gist once established becomes indepen-
dent of scene details, since changing all of the details often fails to
trigger change detection, and changing a few details hardly ever
triggers detection. The speciﬁc lines, edges and features coded in
early vision apparently are used to encode a gist, and then are lost.
Object substitutions that change gist are more easily detected than
substitutions that leave gist intact.
Experiment 2 demonstrates that small perceptual changes are
more readily detected when they change the meaning of a scene,
indicating that gist is an important factor in the encoding and rep-
resentation of a scene. These results substantiate a long-held but
previously unsubstantiated belief that a change to the gist of a
scene is more likely to be detected than a change of similar magni-
tude that does not affect gist.
Experiment 1 supports our assumption that gist was changed in
the experimental images used in Experiment 2. All of the experi-
mental images differed signiﬁcantly from their respective original
images. Though two of the control images are problematic, the
remaining images are adequate to substantiate the study’s overall
conclusions. van Montfort’s (2007) method, used in Experiment 1,
is particularly useful and innovative in helping to determine
whether the gist of two images differs signiﬁcantly.
Experiment 3 supports the proposition that feature changes
were largely equivalent in detectability (notwithstanding gist) in
Experiment 1. Only two of the nine images were at all problematic.
In each case, the resolution seems to be relatively simple (a change
in luminance in one image and a slight change in orientation in the
other). Seven of the nine images were equivalent in their
2282 A.C. Sampanes et al. / Vision Research 48 (2008) 2275–2283perceptual change or differed in a way that would be contrary to
(not favor) the results of Experiment 1. In short, gist was very
important in determining which changes would be detected, while
degree of feature similarity was not systematically related to
detectability.
We have found it difﬁcult to manipulate the gist between two
natural images (A and A0) and create an equivalent perceptual
change in a control image (A0 0) that does not affect gist. Most typ-
ically, when the gist of a scene changes the features of that scene
change also. In other words, things that are different in meaning
in the natural world tend also to be different in appearance (i.e.,
their features or perceptual qualities); extensive change in features
becomes a reliable signal for a change in gist.
The progressive transformation design used here in Experi-
ment 4 extends the traditional ﬂicker paradigm, which uses
alternating images that are identical except for one change, to
progressive substitution of one natural image for another, result-
ing in HIS. Thus, the pixels of one image are substituted with
uncorrelated pixels of another image. Another ﬁnding of change
blindness in complete image change without a change in gist is
the substitution of a natural black-and-white image with its neg-
ative, at the same time changing a target object in the image
(Turatto, Bettella, Umilta’, & Bridgeman 2003). This effect can
be identiﬁed as hidden entire reversal substitution (HERS), show-
ing that changing the polarity of edges in a scene can induce
change blindness without a blank ﬂicker interval. The result
complements the ﬁnding that large changes in low-level details
without a change in the meaning or gist of a scene often go
undetected.
As noted above, a central issue that must be further studied is
how to appropriately deﬁne gist, and the level at which it should
be deﬁned. Should it be deﬁned differently depending on the
context of the task? For instance, are there some questions that
might be best answered deﬁning gist with low-level perceptual
components? How important are individual differences in how
people deﬁne the gist of a scene? Finally, questions remain
about the means of change detection. Is gist the primary crite-
rion for change detection? Do some people ﬁrst use spatial
arrangement or spatial relationships in an attempt to detect
change? More generally, what is the primary strategy(s) for
change detection?
While any one experiment in this paper is subject to some
ambiguity of interpretation, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a thesis that
better matches all of the data than a modiﬁed impoverished-rep-
resentation theory, enhanced with the gist thesis. However, it is
now evident that conscious report of detection can underesti-
mate the integrity of visual representation, and should not be
used as a conclusive evidence for impoverished-representation
theories (Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 2003; Hollingworth,
2006; Hollingworth, Williams, & Henderson, 2001; also see
Simons & Rensink, 2005, for a review). It is therefore possible
that a somewhat detailed representation is stored in a channel
or format that cannot be accessed by consciousness. One notable
exception comes from Hollingworth and Henderson (2002),
where observers detected token, type, and orientation changes
above chance level. We have not observed the same accuracy
as the Hollingworth and Henderson study. In our ﬁnal experi-
ment the entire scene is changed, however, while in theirs one
object is changed or rotated while most of the scene remains un-
changed. Thus, attention might be driven to the change in their
study. Our scenes, then, correspond to type or token changes in
their nomenclature for everything in the scene. Together, our
results suggest that even an entire scene change can go
undetected if gist remains the same, while small changes that
alter gist are more easily detected. We therefore conclude thatgist is a powerful component of scene recognition, sometimes
overshadowing details of the image itself.
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